One Action Too Many: Inapproximability of Budgeted Combinatorial Contracts
with Michal Feldman, Tomasz Ponitka and Maya Schlesinger (accepted to ITCS 2026)
with Michal Feldman, Tomasz Ponitka and Maya Schlesinger (EC 2025)
Fair Division via Resource Augmentation
with Hannaneh Akrami, Alon Eden, Michal Feldman and Amos Fiat (under submission)
When Contracts Get Complex: Information-Theoretic Barriers
with Paul Dütting, Michal Feldman and Aviad Rubinstein (accepted to SODA 2026)
Combinatorial Contracts Beyond Gross Substitutes
with Paul Dütting and Michal Feldman (SODA 2024)